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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O.
SALAZAR

APPELLATE CASE No.
20010297-CA

Plaintiffs - Appellants

-vs-

THRIFTY NICKEL INC., a Utah Corporation,
WANT ADS OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC., a
Utah Corporation, SOUTHERN CROSS, INC.
a Utah Corporation, ROBERT L.
CHRISTENSEN, and
NORMAN WILKINSON
Defendants and Appellees
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Plaintiffs / Appellants Mr and Mrs. Salazar ("Salazar") bring this appeal
from a final order of the Third District Court of Salt lake County, Utah (see
Addendum A). This appeal is taken pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate
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Procedure Title II and was referred to this court pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §78-2-2(4).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
W.

Did the Third District Court properly dismiss the action as to Mr.
Christensen claiming the Salazars' allegations failed as a matter of law to
state a cognizable claim against Christensen?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The propriety of a dismissal of a party's claims
presents a question of law, the Utah Court of Appeals reviews the trial
court's conclusions for correctness, granting them no deference.
Workman v. Brighton Properties, Inc.. 976 P. 2d 1209 (Utah 1999); Lopez v.
Union Pacific Railroad, 932 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1997).

B.

Is a motion to dismiss appropriate when, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs
could recover under the facts alleged?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness
with no deference to the trial court. U.R.C.P. 12(b)(6); Lowe v. Sorenson
Research Co.. 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989)." Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielsen
& Senior, 907 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1995)?

C.

Should Plaintiffs / Appellees be permitted to amend their complaint?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: In a notice pleading jurisdiction like Utah,
Page 6 of 38

U.R.C.P. rule 8(a) "is to be liberally construed when determining the
sufficiency of a plaintiffs' complaint," Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352,1353
(Utah 1986) and the text of rule 8 itself declares that "all pleadings shall be
so construed as to do substantial Justice." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(f).. Allegations
include facts and reasonable inferences therefrom. Cruz v. Middlekauff
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.. 909 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996). As to such legal
questions, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the trial court's conclusions
for correctness, granting them no deference. Workman v. Brighton
Properties, Inc., 976 P. 2d 1209, para. 2 (Utah 1999); Lopez v. Union Pacific
Railroad, 932 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1997).
D.

Can both an entity and its alter ego be liable for full damages caused by a
breach of an employment agreement and, furthermore, is Christensen, as a
shareholder of Thrifty Nickel of Orem protected from suit by plaintiffs'
contract action?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness
with no deference to the trial court. Both an entity and its alter ego are
liable for full damages caused by a breach of an employment agreement
See Piston v. EnviroPak Medical Products, 893 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1995).
Corporate officers and shareholders are not, per se, exempt from personal
liability. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works. 786 P.2d 1350(Utah 1990).
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs, Jose and Mildred Salazar, were rewarded with an Employment
Agreement 1 , dated 1-1-1992, for their years of loyal service to Robert L.
Christensen, owner of the Thrifty Nickel empire 2 . The Agreement gave the
Salizars certain employment, severance, and retirement benefits.

Mr. Christensen was involved as an author of the Employment Agreement
and authorized its signing. Mr. Christensen has refused to provide postemployment compensation and other benefits in accordance with the terms of
the Agreement.
After unsuccessfully making demands of Mr. Christensen for payment,
the Salazar 7 s filed suit 3 on August 8, 2000, seeking recovery of funds owed to
them. The Third District Court issued an Order for Alternative Service on
December 6, 2000 after Mr. Christensen avoided service for nearly four months.
Salazar's also brought suit against several Thrifty Nickel companies and officers
all of which have been dismissed.

1

. See Addendum C

2

. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01,16 & 7.

3

. Complaint, see Addendum B.
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Mr. Christensen has not answered the complaint against him but filed a
December 28,2000 Motion to Dismiss4 plaintiffs' complaint. The motion's only
averment was that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On March 5, 2001, Mr. Christensen's Motion to Dismiss came on for
hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the Third District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. After oral argument Judge Frederick
granted the Motion with an Order issued on March 14, 20015.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Salazars seek to have the order of the lower court reversed with the
matter remanded for further proceedings including amendment of the
complaint.

4

. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is found in Addendum G.

5

. See Addendum A.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Plaintiffs, Jose and Mildred Salazar, were rewarded with an Employment
Agreement 6 , dated 1-1-1992, for their ten years 7 of loyal service to their friend 8
Robert L. Christensen, owner of the Thrifty Nickel empire 9 . The Employment
Agreement was an inducement 10 for the Salazar's to move their place of
employment to Utah11. The Agreement gave the Salizars certain employment,
severance, and retirement benefits.
Mr. Christensen played a part in drafting 12 the Employment Agreement,
was aware of its terms, approved the document 13 and authorized his son, Tim
Taylor, to sign14 it on behalf of the Thrifty Nickel companies. Mr. Christensen

6

. See Addendum C

7

. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 01, 12. Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar dated
11 Jan 01, 12. See Addendums D & E.
8

. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 01, 1 7. Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar dated
11 Jan 01, 1 7.
9

. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01,16 & 7.

10

. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01,1f3. See Addendum F.

". Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 01,13. Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar dated
11 Jan 01,13.
12

. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01,14.

13

. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 01,16. Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar
dated 11 Jan 01,16.
14

. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01,15.
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reaffirmed the validity of the Employment Agreement in 199915 despite a change
in the company name 16 . Mr. Christensen has refused to provide postemployment compensation and other benefits in accordance with the terms of
the Agreement. Plaintiffs, both over 65 years of age, were summarily terminated
without cause from their employment on April 28, 2000.

After making demands of Mr. Christensen for payment, the Salazar's filed
suit 17 on August 8, 2000, alleging, inter alia, that their friend Mr. Christensen
owned in whole or in part many of the Thrifty Nickel companies, that he
personally controls the operations of more or less 86 entities publishing
classified advertisement newspapers throughout the United States, most of
which publish under the banner "Thrifty Nickel/ 7 Mr. Christensen is the sole
shareholder of Want Ads of Salt Lake and Southern Cross Co., a member of the
board of directors, and, truly, the alter ego of the Thrifty Nickel businesses.
Further, the Salazars complained that there should be no corporate veil
distinguishing or protecting the assets of the defendant 18 . The Third District
Court issued an Order for Alternative Service on December 6, 2000 after Mr.

15

. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 01, If9. Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar dated
11 Jan 01,19.
16

. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01, | 6 .

17

. Complaint, see Addendum B.

18

. Complaint, paragraph 37.
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Christensen avoided service for nearly four months. Salazar's also brought suit
against several Thrifty Nickel companies and officers all of which have been
dismissed.

Mr. Christensen has not answered the complaint against him but filed a
December 28,2000 Motion to Dismiss 19 plaintiffs7 complaint. The motion's only
averment was that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. He attempted to expand the grounds for dismissal in his
accompanying memorandum claiming that, as a shareholder of Thrifty Nickel,
plaintiffs' contract action against him is barred or that the alleged facts fail to
support a claim of piercing the corporate veil against him.
Mr. Christensen was dismissed by the Third District Court over objections
of the Salazars. Their request to amend their complaint, if needed, to adequately
allege damages by Mr. Christensen was ignored. Though discovery and a
deposition of Mr. Christensen had been noticed-up by the Salazars 20 , they were
not allowed to proceed with development of their case against Mr. Christensen.

19

. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is found in Addendum G.

20

'. Plaintiffs mailed a Notice of Deposition to defendants attorney, Scott Call, on
February 27, 2001 for an April 24, 2001 deposition.
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ARGUMENTS
I. Plaintiffs' Complaint, as a matter of law, states a cognizable claim against
Christensen.
The complaint, supplemented with plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Opposition to defendant's Motion to Dismiss supplemented with three
affidavits, sets forth the facts of the case and provides a basis for relief.
"A grant of a motion to dismiss is proper 'only where it appears that the
plaintiff... would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any
state of facts they could prove to support their claim.' Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co.,
828 P.2d 496,499 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766
(Utah 1991))." Hobbs v. Labor Commission, 991 P.2d 590, (Utah 1999). As to
such legal questions, the Utah Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's
conclusions for correctness, granting them no deference. Workman v. Brighton
Properties, Inc., 976 P. 2d 1209, para. 2 (Utah 1999); Lopez v. Union Pacific
Railroad, 932 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1997).
In the case of Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252
(Utah 1996) the issue was the reverse of the present case. The District Court had
refused to dismiss the action. The court concluded that "the trial court properly
denied [defendant's] rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because under the alleged
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facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom, the complaint states a claim upon
which relief can be granted/7 (emphasis added)
Case law is replete with clear edicts that, "A motion to dismiss is
appropriate only where it clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would
not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they
could prove to support their claim." Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991)
(citing Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990)); see also,
Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc., 815 P.2d 1356,1360 (Utah App. 1991).
"Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a severe measure given the liberality
of notice pleading". DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Company, 835 P.2d 1000, (Utah
App. 1992).
Plaintiffs alleged facts21 which, when proven at trial, will show defendant
Robert Christensen to be liable for damages suffered. "A motion to dismiss is
appropriate only when it is apparent that as a matter of law, the plaintiff could
not recover under the facts alleged. U.R.C.P. 12(b)(6); Lowe v. Sorenson Research
Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989)." Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior, 907
P.2d 1162 (Utah 1995).

. See the complaint in Addendum B, and plaintiffs' affidavits in Addendums C & D.
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A. Utah is a notice pleading state requiring pleadings to be construed as to do
substantial justice.

Utah is a notice pleading state. The text of rule 8 itself declares that "all
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial Justice." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(f).
In a notice pleading jurisdiction like Utah, rule 8(a) "is to be liberally construed
when determining the sufficiency of a plaintiffs7 complaint," Gill v. Timm, 720
P.2d 1352,1353 (Utah 1986) and
The claim need not be specific, rather, "under Utah's liberal notice
pleading requirements, all that is required is that the pleadings be sufficient to
give fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general
indication of the type of litigation involved." Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light
969 P.2d 403,406 (Utah 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). See
also Gill v. Timm. 720 P.2d 1352,1353 (Utah 1986) and Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3
Utah 2d 157,161,280 P.2d 453,455 (1955)).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, "[w]e construe the facts in the complaint
liberally and we consider all the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts
in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs." Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427,430
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). Our review of the motion to dismiss presents a question of
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law, which we review for correctness, giving "the trial court's ruling no
deference." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194,196
(Utah 1991). Busche v. Salt Lake County. 2001 UT App 111 (Utah App.
04/05/2001).
Under rules of notice pleading, it is sufficient that defendants be given
only a fair idea of the nature of the claims asserted against them sufficient to
apprize them of the general basis of the claim. Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216
(N.M. App. 1997) Plaintiffs' complaint, memorandum in opposition to
defendant's motion to dismiss, and affidavits were more than adequate to
inform Mr Christensen that the Salazars held him to be personally involved in
their employment contract and that they sought to hold him personally liable for
their damages.
Mr. Christensen was well aware of the allegations against him and took
action to avoid service of summons. In total, his involvement in drafting the
Employment Agreement22, his avoidance of service23, and other alleged facts
constitute fair notice of alter ego and piercing the corporate veil as discussed
later in this brief.

22

. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01,14.

23

. Plaintiffs' Motion to Serve Defendant Robert L. Christensen by Mail and Minute
Entry Ruling. See Addendum H.
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"Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a severe measure given the
liberality of notice pleading, and must be granted only when it is apparent that
under no set of facts proven in support of the claim as pleaded would a party be
entitled to relief." Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356,1360 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (citing Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah
1990)).

B. Appellants should be given an opportunity through discovery to prove
that Mr. Christensen was, in fact, a party to the Employment Contract.
Many facts are in dispute in the current matter. Defendant has not yet
answered plaintiffs' complaint. It is, therefore, unclear, precisely which facts are
in dispute.
Many facts are yet to be discovered. Plaintiff had filed its First Set of
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on February 27, 2001.
These remain unanswered and are attached as Addendum I. Among other yet
undiscovered important issues are the following:

1.

What was the extent of defendant's involvement in any of the defendant
corporations?

2.

Does defendant now or did he previously own stock in any corporation
Page 17 of 38

that is listed as a defendant in this lawsuit? If so, how many shares does
he now own or has he previously owned and what percentage of
ownership does this represent?
3.

What input has defendant had into the making of or knowledge of the
existence of the Employment Agreement with plaintiffs?

4.

Has defendant ever served as a director, officer, or representative of any of
the Thrifty Nickel companies?

5.

Did defendant ever loan money to any of the defendant corporations? If
so, state when and the amount, and the balance still owed on each loan.

6.

Did any of the defendant corporations loan defendant any money?

7.

Did defendant ever guaranty or cosign any obligation of any of the
defendant corporations?

8.

Did any of the defendants ever advance funds to defendant Christensen
for services to be performed later?

9.

At any time since 1996 , did you incorporate or cause to be incorporated
any other corporation?
Defendant owns a national network of classified newspapers under the

"Thrifty Nickel" banner. Defendant's personal relationship and involvement in
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the operations of these newspapers can only be uncovered in the discovery
process.
These questions are critical to defendant's liability under the subject
Employment Agreement. A checklist of 17 facts and circumstances tending to
show that a corporate president is alter ego of a corporation is found in 18 Am
Jur 2d, Corporations, §53.
The lower court assumed Mr. Christensen was protected behind the
corporate veil. This presumption can be rebutted. When rebutted, the
discharged employee may have a claim for breach of contract. Berube v. Fashion
Centre. 771 P.2d 1033 at 1044 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.), 1051
(Zimmerman, J., Concurring in the result); Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis
Utah. Inc.. No. 20246,114 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 111 P.2d 483 (June 28,1989).
Under the factual allegations of the complaint, the Salizars have stated such a
claim for breach of contract. Construing their allegations in a light most
favorable to the Salazars, the facts support a claim for contract damages. See
Berube v. Fashion Centre, 771 P.2d 1033 at 1044-46 (Durham, J., joined by
Stewart, J.), 1050 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., Concurring, joined by Hall, C.J.), 1052-53
(Zimmerman, J., Concurring in the result); Caldwell, slip op. at 7. "Therefore,
we vacate the grant of the motion to dismiss and remand for further
proceedings." Lowe v. Sorenson, 779 P.2d 668, (Utah 1989).
Page 19 of 38

There exist many questions of fact in the appealed case. Discovery had
barely begun. The Salazars listed some 25 issues of fact that were still in dispute.
It was premature for the Court to dismiss the action.
The District Court had at its disposable an alternative to dismissal that
would have much better served the needs of justice. In an earlier case, the Utah
Supreme Court observed that further discovery was needed, "The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice and allowed the parties 120 days
for discovery... to determine whether a written employment contract existed
between the parties/' Lowe v. Sorenson Reasearch Co., 779 P.2d 668, (Utah
1989).

II. The Third District Court should have limited its scope to the single issue
brought out in the Motion to Dismiss.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the complaint narrowly focused on only
one allegation, that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Defendant then attempts to expand the requested grounds for
dismissal in his accompanying memorandum claiming that, as a shareholder of
Thrifty Nickel, plaintiffs' contract action against him is barred or that the alleged
facts fail to support a claim of piercing the corporate veil against him.
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Judge Frederick's decision stated "All that's alleged is that Mr.
Christensen was an owner, that he had knowledge of the contract... the sum
total of the allegations incident to Christensen's involvement here do not give
fair notice of a claim of attempt to breach corporate veil..."
It becomes obvious that Judge Frederick may not have recently read the
complaint. The complaint (See Addendum B) contains the following allegations
against Mr. Christensen:
5.

Defendant Robert L. Christensen (Christensen) is an individual believed to
reside in the State of Florida and doing business in Salt Lake County,
Utah.

7.

Plaintiffs entered into a written Employment Agreement with
Defendant(s) Thrifty Nickel on January 1,1992. A copy of the
Employment Agreement, marked Exhibit 1 [Addendum B herein], is
attached and made a part of this pleading.

19.

Plaintiffs worked continuously and diligently under their Employment
Agreement for defendants receiving pay checks for succeeding and
inconsistently intermixed periods from Thrifty Nickel, WASL, Southern
Cross, and others.

21.

Thrifty Nickel was and is owned in whole or part by defendant
Page 21 of 38

Christensen.

28.

Defendant Christensen is the controlling shareholder of more or less eightsix (86) entities publishing classified advertisement newspapers through
the United States, most of which publish under the banner "Thrifty
Nickel."

29.

Defendant Christensen is the sole shareholder of WASL and Souther
Cross.

30.

"Advertise it in Your Dynamic Thrifty Nickel Want Ads" is a trademark
registered on July 13,1992 in Utah and owned by defendant Christensen
or an entity ultimately owned and / or controlled by defendant
Christensen.

32.

In addition to being the sole shareholder of WASL, defendant Christensen
is a member of its board of directors.

36.

The transfers of assets [between the three corporate defendants] occurred
at the direction of defendants Christensen and / or Wilkinson.

37.

There should be no corporate veil distinguishing

or protecting the assets

of any of the five defendants, (emphasis added.)

The basis for Judge Frederick's decision is patently in error. Allegations in
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the complaint and related reasonable inferences present a case against Mr.
Christensen which, at the very least, are adequate to sustain the case well into
the discovery process.

III. The Complaint gives fair notice that Christensen, as owner of the Thrifty
Nickel companies, is not immune to a personal employment contract with
friends and employees.
Focus must remain on Christensen's personal authorization 24 of the initial
Employment Agreement and his ratification of the contract at a later date 25 . This
has been alleged and will be clearly and conclusively shown at trial.
Plaintiffs' complaint is supported by their memorandum in opposition to
defendant's motion to dismiss and three supporting affidavits submitted in
opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss. See Addendums D, E and F. The
motion and supporting affidavits verify the complaint and must be considered
as support of the complaint. The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "We have
indicated that general allegations in an unverified complaint are an insufficient
basis for opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment. D & L

24

. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 01, f l & 5.

25

. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 01,19. Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar
dated 11 Jan 01,19.
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Supply v.Saurini, 775 P.2d 420; Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224,226-27 (Utah
1983). Thayne simply did not meet his burden of presenting some evidence, by
affidavit or otherwise, raising a credible issue of material fact. Dupler v. Yates,
10 Utah 2d 251,351 P.2d 624, 637 (Utah I960)." Thane v. Beneficial Life. 874 P.2d
120, (1994). Plaintiffs in this case did raise "credible issues of material fact."

Plaintiffs' affidavits state that plaintiffs entered into an Employment
Contract on January 1,1992. Plaintiffs have plead and will prove that
Christensen knew of and, as may be shown in discovery, suggested the
Employment Agreement 26 as a reward and inducement 27 for plaintiffs' to move
to Utah. 28
Christensen was a party 29 to the Employment Agreement. He approved
the document 30 and personally authorized Tim Taylor, as his agent31, to sign the
Employment Agreement.
At trial, the facts will show that Christensen personally benefitted from
26

. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 0 1 , 1 6 & 7.

21

. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 0 1 , J3.

28

. Affidavit of T i m Taylor dated 16 Jan 0 1 , | 3 . Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan
0 1 , p . Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar dated 11 Jan 0 1 , f 3 .
29

. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 0 1 , | 6 . Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar
dated 11 Jan 0 1 , 1 6 .
30

3

. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 0 1 , f l .

'. Affidavit of Tim Taylor dated 16 Jan 0 1 , %5.
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the services of plaintiffs. In addition to his close friendship evidenced by many
specific requests for personal services and inviting them over for holiday meals,
he valued their significant contributions to his growing organizations.32
Defendant Christensen reaffirmed the validity of the Employment
Agreement and his commitment to it in return for the Salazars' services in
August of 1999 when transferring Salazars to another Thrifty Nickel company.33

IV. Plaintiffs' have alleged facts to support a claim of piercing the corporate
veil and alter ego against Christensen
Both an entity and its alter ego are liable for full damages caused by a
breach of an employment agreement See Piston v. EnviroPak Medical Products,
893 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1995). Corporate officers and shareholders are not, per se,
exempt from personal liability. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, 786 P.2d
1350(Utah 1990).
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss states on page
4 that a shareholder cannot be personally liable for corporate debts. Likewise,

32

. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 0 1 , f 7 . Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar

dated 11 Jan 01, f 7.
33

. Affidavit of Jose S. Salazar dated 11 Jan 01,1f9. Affidavit of Mildred O. Salazar
dated 11 Jan 0 1 , %9.
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defendant's Motions incorrectly focuses on the necessity of 'piercing the
corporate veil' in order for an officer to become liable to debts.
The Utah Supreme Court disagrees and has refuted this position as stated
in Richard W. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, 786 P.2d 1350(Utah 1990),
" In order to disregard the corporate entity, two circumstances must be
shown: (1) such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, but the
corporation is, instead, the alter-ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) if
observed, the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or
result in an inequity.

Colman v Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct.

App. 1987) See also Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d
42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). One of the factors deemed significant in
determining whether this test has been met is the use of the corporation as
a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder. Colman v. Colman,
743 P.2d at 786. At the beginning of trial, the court stated that Gardner
and Hernandez were personally liable under the April agreement and the
trial proceeded with that ruling in place. The court found that Gardner
and Hernandez were the real parties in interest, that they were intended
as parties to the agreement, and that "Dinero Services Inc. was not
considered by the parties as an operative entity as far as the dealings
between the parties were concerned." These findings are supported by the
evidence, especially considering the history of transactions in this matter,
and meet the required legal criteria for piercing the corporate veil.
Therefore, the court did not err in holding Gardner and Hernandez
personally liable to Poggio under the April agreement." (emphasis added)
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This same reasoning is supported in learned treatises and univerally
accepted legal authorities. " Alter ego is an equitable doctrine which allows
courts the discretion to disregard a corporate entity and hold individuals
responsible for acts done in the name of a corporation. See Black's Law
Dictionary 77-78 (6th ed. 1990).
The Utah Supreme Court in Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co.,
596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979), established a two-prong test to determine whether a
court may disregard the corporate entity under the alter ego doctrine: (1) there
must be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of
the corporation and the individual no longer exist, viz., the corporation is, in
fact, the alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) the observance of the
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable
result would follow/' Id. at 1030. " Werner-Jacobsen v. Bednarick, 327 Utah Adv.
Rep. 45 (Utah 1997).
Further clarification of the line between being protected and being liable is
found in the following reasoning,
"Generally, a corporation is treated as a legal entity separate from its
shareholders, thereby permitting shareholders to commit limited capital
to the corporation with the assurance that they will have no personal
liability for the corporation's debts. Krendl & Krendl, "Piercing the
Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry", 55 Den. L. J. 1 (1978). When,
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however, the corporate structure is used so improperly that the continued
recognition of the corporation as a separate legal entity would be unfair,
the corporate entity may be disregarded and corporate principals held
liable for the corporation's actions. Id. at 2.
"Thus, if it is shown that shareholders used the corporate entity as a mere
instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs without regard to
separate and independent corporate existence, or for the purpose of
defeating or evading important legislative policy, or in order to perpetrate
a fraud or wrong on another, equity will permit the corporate form to be
disregarded and will hold the shareholders personally responsible for the
corporation's improper actions. See Fink v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 161
Colo. 342,350,421 P.2d 735, 739 (1966); Gutheil v. Polichio. 103 Colo. 426,
431,86 P.2d 972,974 (1939); Lafond v. Basham, 683 P.2d 367,369 (Colo.
App. 1984); Krendl & Krendl, supra at 28-43.
In the absence of a fully developed factual record and adequate findings
of fact, however, we cannot determine whether that equitable doctrine
should be applied here. We leave it to the hearing officer to resolve this
issue on remand of the case." Micciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367 (CO 1986)
(emphasis added)
Plaintiffs will prove at trial that the assets of the various Thrifty Nickel
companies are maintained at artificially low levels. This will further expose
defendant Christensen to personal liability as, "It is coming to be recognized as
the policy of the law that shareholders should in good faith put at the risk of the
business unencumbered capital reasonably adequate for its prospective
liabilities. If the capital is illusory or trifling compared with the business to be
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done and the risks of loss, this is a ground for denying the separate entity
privileged Salt Lake City Corporation v. James, 761 P.2d 42. (emphasis added)
Alter ego is a question of fact. An exhaustive list of areas need to be
explored to determine Robert Christensen's involvement in this case. Such
questions include the following: (both past and present tense)
1.

What office(s) has Mr. Christensen held within the Thrifty
Nickel" organization?

2.

What corporate structures have existed in the past ten years?

3.

Is he the ultimate authority in the company's dealings?

4.

Is he the primary owner?

5.

Is he the dominant personality in the organization?

6.

Has Mr. Christensen been a key decision-maker for the
various companies?

7.

What is his salary and remuneration history?

8.

Has there been intermixing of various companies' accounts?

9.

Is there sufficient ownership and interest to support the alter
ego contentions?
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10.

Have his companies been undercapitalized?

11.

Has there been unauthorized diversion of funds?

12.

Has Mr. Christensen treated corporate assets as his own?

13.

Have all company formalities been observed?

14.

Were personal and corporate funds intermingled?

15.

Is Mr. Christensen the sole or dominant shareholder?

16.

Did he play a key role in establishing or directing corporate
policies?

17.

Have corporate assets been misstated from time to time?

18.

Has allegedly criminal activity been directed by Mr.
Christensen?

19.

Has the corporation been used as part of a scheme to promote
activities in opposition to the public interest?

20.

Is there common or overlapping stock ownership, directors or
officers between the various Thrifty Nickel companies?

21.

What loans have transpired between Mr. Christensen and the
companies?
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22.

Who was instrumental in incorporating the various
companies?

23.

How have tax returns been handled?

24.

Were various Thrifty Nickel companies allowed to operate
independently?

25.

What contracts exist between the Thrifty Nickel companies
and any parent company?

Many of these questions are raised in plaintiffs' currently outstanding
First Interrogatories and Request for Production (see Addendum I). Others will
be addressed in Mr. Christensen's deposition and in later discovery. Whether
Thrifty Nickel can be shown to be the alter ego of Robert Christensen will e
proven upon completion of plaintiffs' discovery.
Both an entity and its alter ego are liable for full damages caused by a
breach of an employment agreement. In the 1995 Utah case of Diston v.
EnviroPak Medical Products, 893 P.2d 1071, Judge David E. Roth and Frank G.
Noel, JJ, held that an employee could collect damages from both the parent
company and its alter ego. On appeal by the company, Judge Wilkins affirmed
that a plaintiff (Diston) claiming damages under an employment contract could
collect damages from both a company (Surgical) and its alter ego company
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(EnviroPak).
EnviroPak, like Thrifty Nickel of Orem, went broke. The court held,
nevertheless, " . . . the fact that EnviroPak was losing money, or not making
enough money, may provide Surgical with a legitimate reason for ending its
operations, but it does not excuse the obligations of EnvirPak.
"Surgical, as the alter ego of EnviroPak, is liable for the full damages
caused by EnviroPak's breach of the . . . employment agreement with Mr.
Diston. Surgical is liable, under an alter ego theory, for the obligations incurred
by EnviroPak/7

V. Judge Frederick did not consider the issue of amending the Complaint.
Plaintiffs / Appellees should be permitted to amend their complaint to
cover any potential shortcomings. This alternative was requested by plaintiffs in
their Motion in Opposition to defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
The effect of technical deficiencies in a complaint were handled well in
Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268 (Utah 1996)
wherein the late Judge Stirba wrote,
" . . . the defect in the complaint about which SPI complains is nothing
more than a technicality. In a notice pleading jurisdiction like Utah, rule
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8(a) "is to be liberally construed when determining the sufficiency of a
plaintiffs complaint," Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352,1353 (Utah 1986) and
the text of rule 8 itself declares that "all pleadings shall be so construed as
to do substantial Justice." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(f). The days of strict adherence
to draconian formalities at the pleading stage are over. Rather, "the
fundamental purpose of the liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties
'the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have
pertaining to their dispute,' subject only to the requirement that their
adversaries have 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the
claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Williams
v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982).
The decision continues,
" The principals in SPI and Rockin' Robin were the same, and Lowe, a vice
president and general counsel of SPI and shareholder of Rockin Robin,
negotiated the assignment of the lease and was heavily involved in the
project from the beginning. In addition, it is apparent from the defenses
raised by SPI that it understood precisely what claims were being made
and to which agreement they pertained. Under these circumstances, there
can be no doubt that SPI had notice of Consolidated's claim and that SPI
was not unfairly prejudiced. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b)."

V. Judge Frederick failed to consider equity.
Judge Frederick introduced his decision by stating, "On a motion to
dismiss, the issue of the equitable nature of the claims asserted by the respective
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parties is really beyond the scheme of my inquiry here, Mr. Houser." See the
Hearing Transcript page 12 found in Addendum J.
But for the seriousness of plaintiffs' claim, Judge Frederick's introductory
statement would be humorous. The definition of alter ego, on which he based
his decision reads " Alter ego is an equitable doctrine which . . . " See Black's Law
Dictionary 77-78 (6th ed. 1990). It is an oxymoron for Judge Frederick to say that
equity cannot be considered in a motion to dismiss and then order the dismissal
based on an equitable doctrine.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that"... a trial court's "discretion
should be exercised in furtherance of justice and should incline towards granting
relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may have a hearing." Helgesen
v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079,1081 (Utah 1981) (citing Warren v. Dixon Ranch
Co.. 123 Utah 416,420, 260 P.2d 741, 743 (1953) quoted in Lund v. Brown, 2000
UT 75 (Utah 09/22/2000). This statement appears in a case overturning a
Default Judgment. The instant case is of a similar nature. The Salazars, if this
case is dismissed with prejudice, may well be without further remedy and left
without pension throughout their retirement. This court can prevent this gross
injustice!
The present case involves the sensitive issue of an elderly couples'
entitlement to retirement benefits. In a similarly sensitive divorce case where
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the trial court had considered equitable matters in its decision, this court stated,
"Given these facts, the equitable nature of divorce proceedings, and the court's
continuing jurisdiction in divorce cases, there was no reversible error in the trial
court's consideration of the order to show cause along with the petition to
modify. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1998) (establishing court's continuing
jurisdiction); Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431,439 (Utah 1993) (Orme, J.,
Concurring) (noting that law of the case doctrine does not prevent court from
"catching a mistake and fixing it")/' Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431,361 Utah Adv.
Rep. 15 (Utah App. 01/22/1999).
In the instant case, allowing Mr. Christensen to hide behind the corporate
form would sanction fraud, promote injustice, and result in inequity. In such
cases, the corporate entity is disregarded. Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872
P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1994).
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CONCLUSION

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Utah Court of Appeals construes
"the facts in the complaint liberally and we consider all the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the back in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs.34

Judge Frederick erred in ruling that plaintiffs' complaint, memoranda,
affidavits and reasonable inferences therefrom 35 were insufficient to give the
defendant Robert Christensen "fair notice" and "a "fair idea of the nature of the
claims asserted against them sufficient to apprise them" 36 of the nature and basis
of the claim asserted and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.
The liberality of notice pleading acknowledges that dismissal is a severe
measure. 37 All pleadings must be construed as to do substantial justice.38 If
necessary, plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their complaint. 39

Further, the equitable nature of the alter ego and piercing the corporate
veil doctrines, mandate that once fair notice is given, the facts of the case must

[

. Baker v. Angus, supra

. See Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury. Inc., supra.
'. Garcia v. Coffman. supra
. See Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc.. supra
;

. U.R.C.P §8(f)

'. Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter. Inc.. supra
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be ascertained through discovery and trial. Many facts remain in dispute. Many
facts are yet to be discovered. Plaintiffs will prove the defendant has no valid
defenses.
WHEREFORE, respondent respectfully prays that the order of the
lower court be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

DATED this 2nd day of August, 2001.

Conrad B. Houser
Attorney for Plaintiff - Appellant
136 East South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on August 2,2001, a copy of the Notice of Appeal was hand
delivered personally by me to:

Scott A. Call
James H. Tily
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006.

Conrad B. Houser
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Scott A. Call, #0544
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Facsimile: (801)364-7697

By.

SALT LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendants Southern Cross, Inc. and Norman Wilkinson
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O.
SALAZAR,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 000906212
Judge Frederick

THIRFTY NICKLE OF OREM, INC., a
Utah corporation; WANT ADS OF
SALT LAKE CITY, INC., a Utah
corporation; SOUTHERN CROSS,
INC., a Utah corporation; and
NORMAN WILKINSON, an individual,

Defendants.
Defendant Robert L. Christensen's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint came
on regularly for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis Fredrick on Monday, March 5, 2001,
9:00 a.m. Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel of record, Conrad B. Houser.

i

AUUmNUUlVI i

Defendant Robert L. Christensen was represented by his counsel of record, Scott A. Call of
Anderson & Karrenberg.
The Court, having reviewed the Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant Robert L.
Christensen's Motion to Dismiss and supporting memoranda and the Plaintiffs' opposing
memoranda, having heard the argument of counsel thereon and good cause appearing
therefore, hereby makes and enters the following order
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Defendant Robert L. Christensen's Motion to Dismiss is
granted for the reasons set forth in the memoranda filed in support of Defendant Robert L.
Christensen's Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, all claims in this action against Defendant
Robert L. Christensen are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
DATED: l^March ^

,2001.
BY THE COURT:

J. Dennis Frederick
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

/Qonradli. Houser
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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ADDENDUM A

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this Jjj_ day of March, 2001, and following entry thereof, I caused
to be placed in the United States Mail, via first class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL, to:
Conrad B. Houser, Esq.
175 South Main Street, Ste 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Scott A. Call, Esq.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway, Ste 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006

CV. few
Clerk

3

Conrad B. Houser (3612)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
175 South Main Street
Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR

COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs
-vs-

Judge

YjJL d^AM^k.

THRIFTY NICKEL OF OREM, INC., a Utah
Corporation,
WANT ADS OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC., a Utah
Corporation,
SOUTHERN CROSS, INC. a Utah Corporation,
ROBERT L. CHRISTENSEN, and
NORMAN WILKINSON

District Court Civil No.

Defendants
PLAINTIFFS, JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR file this action for breach of an
Employment Agreement and other employment related damages against DEFENDANTS,
THRIFTY NICKEL OF OREM, INC., a Utah Corporation, WANT ADS OF SALT LAKE CITY,
INC., a Utah Corporation, SOUTHERN CROSS, INC. a Utah Corporation, ROBERT L.
CHRISTENSEN, and NORMAN WILKINSON. In support of this action, Plaintiff will show
the Court the following:

PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Plaintiffs are both residents of Salt Lake County, Utah.

2.

Defendant Thrifty Nickel of Or em, Inc. (Thrifty Nickel) is revoked predecessor Utah
company of Defendant Southern Cross, Inc. and was controlled by Defendant Robert
L. Christensen.

3.

Defendant Want Ads of Salt Lake City, Inc. (WASL) is a closely-held Nevada
corporation incorporated on or about June 20,1997, first registered in Utah on
September 23,1997, and with offices in and doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah,
from its office at 7097 South State Street, Midvale, Utah 84047.

4.

Defendant Southern Cross, Inc. (Southern Cross) is a closely-held Utah corporation
incorporated on or about May 5,1992 and with offices in and doing business in Utah
and Salt Lake Counties, Utah.

5.

Defendant Robert L. Christensen (Christensen) is an individual believed to reside in
the State of Florida and doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah.

6.

Defendant Norman Wilkinson (Wilkinson) is an individual residing in Utah County,
State of Utah and doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
7.

Plaintiffs entered into a written Employment Agreement with Defendant(s) Thrifty
Nickel on January 1,1992. A copy of the Employment Agreement, marked Exhibit 1, is
attached and made a part of this pleading.

8.

The Employment Agreement, containing no stated term, was perpetual.

9.

The Employment Agreement stipulated a weekly salary to the Plaintiffs jointly of
$1,400 per week.

10.

Plaintiffs, under the terms of the Employment Agreement, were to perform as
"Distribution Managers including; logging routes, hiring drivers, distributing the
Thrifty Nickel, getting new locations, upkeep of all indoor and outdoor racks, dealing
with the printer and any other assigned company initiatives as required/7
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11.

Duties as stated in the Employment Agreement were to be performed in "the Orem,
Provo, and Salt Lake City, Utah area and at such other place(s) as the needs, business,
or opportunities of the Employer may require from time to time.,/

12.

Benefits under the Employment Agreement included vacation of 3 weeks (after 1996)
"with salary paid in full."

13.

Benefits under the Employment Agreement included (after 1992), paid medical and
dental insurance.

14.

Benefits under the Employment Agreement included (after 1992), retirement at age 65
for 10 years in the amount of $600 per week for each of the plaintiffs.

15.

Plaintiffs are both over the age of 65.

16.

The Employment Agreement also provided for severance pay (after 1996) of six
months pay if terminated without cause, this amount to be paid, upon request, as a
lump sum at present value.

17.

The Employment Agreement also provided that "if litigation after termination without
cause shall be brought to enforce or interpret any provision contained herein,
Employer, to the extent permitted by applicable law, indemnifies Employees for
Employee's reasonable attorneys' fees and disbursements incurred in such litigation."

18.

Plaintiffs worked for various Thrifty Nickel newspapers in New Mexico and Utah for
over nineteen (19) years.

19.

Plaintiffs worked continuously and diligently under their Employment Agreement for
defendants receiving pay checks for succeeding and inconsistently intermixed periods
from Thrifty Nickel, WASL, Southern Cross, and others.

20.

On April 28, 2000, without cause, Plaintiffs were notified their Employment Agreement
was terminated effective that same day. A copy of the termination, attached as Exhibit
2, is made a part of this pleading.

21.

Thrifty Nickel was and is owned in whole or part by defendant Christensen.
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22.

Thrifty Nickel's right to operate in Utah was revoked by the Director of the Utah
Division of Corporations.

23.

Thrifty Nickel's operations continued without significant interruption or change of
procedures under ownership of defendant WASL or defendant Southern Cross.

24.

Defendant WASL purportedly ceased doing business on or about August 5,1999.

25.

Defendant WASL's operations continued without significant interruption or change of
procedures under ownership of defendant Southern Cross.

26.

Newspapers and other publications selling classified advertisements using the name
Thrifty Nickel, are published regularly in numerous markets throughout the United
States.

27.

Thrifty Nickel newspapers are distributed through racks and depositories typically
near the front entrance of businesses such as supermarkets, restaurants, and
convenience stores.

28.

Defendant Christensen is the controlling shareholder of more or less eighty-six (86)
entities publishing classified advertisement newspapers throughout the United States,
most of which publish under the banner "Thrifty Nickel."

29.

Defendant Christensen is the sole shareholder of WASL and Southern Cross.

30.

"Advertise it in Your Dynamic Thrifty Nickel Want Ads" is a trademark registered on
July 13,1992 in Utah and owned by defendant Christensen or an entity ultimately
owned and / or controlled by defendant Christensen.

31.

Defendant WASL's authority to transact business in Utah was revoked on or about
December 1,1998.

32.

In addition to being the sole shareholder of WASL, defendant Christensen is a member
of its board of directors.

33.

Defendant Wilkinson has been associated with Christensen and various Thrifty Nickel
enterprises for approximately twenty (20) years.
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34.

Defendant Wilkinson is president of both WASL and Southern Cross, and the treasurer
and a director of Southern Cross.

35.

The transfer of assets between the three corporate defendants is alleged to be
fraudulent under an action currently in process in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Utah, Central Division, Case No. 99C-31762.

36.

The transfers of assets occurred at the direction of defendants Christensen and / or
Wilkinson.

37.

There should be no corporate veil distinguishing or protecting the assets of any of the
five defendants.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
BREACH OF CONTRACT

38.

Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate herein the allegations of all preceding paragraphs.

39.

Defendants, in terminating plaintiffs without cause, breached the subject Employment
Agreement.

40.

Plaintiffs are entitled to Severance Pay in the amount of six (6) months salary, the net
present value of which, discounted at 5%, is $36,024.49 plus interest from April 28, 2000.

41.

Plaintiffs are each entitled to Retirement pay at the rate of $600 per month for ten (10)
years which, discounted at 5%, is $505,928.07 plus interest from April 28, 2000.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
FAILURE TO MAINTAIN MEDICAL INSURANCE

42.

Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate herein the allegations of all preceding paragraphs.

43.

Under the terms of the Employment Contract, Defendants are required to provide medical
insurance coverage. Because of defendants' negligence in allowing the insurance to several
times lapse and by failing to provide litigation defense, judgment was rendered against plaintiff
Jose Salazar in the amount of $1,124.66.

44.

Plaintiff Jose Salazar is entitled to be compensated the full amount about of $1,124.66 plus
interest and any related costs to rectify his credit rating.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
FAILURE TO PAY VACATION PAY

45.

Plaintiffs reassert and incorporate herein the allegations of all preceding paragraphs.

46.

Under the terms of the Employment Contract, Defendants are required to provide for three
weeks of annual vacation.

47.

Plaintiffs were not given vacation for the past three years. They are due, therefore, the
net present value of which, discounted at 5%, is $ 15,292.20 plus interest from April 28,
2000.

Wherefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request the following relief of at least $548,857 as follows:
1.

Judgement against the Defendants jointly and severally in the current amount of
$505,929;

2.

Interest from April 28, 2000 currently totaling $15,028;
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3.

Court costs;

4.

Attorney's fees of $10,000 to bring this action; and

5.

Such other relief in the premises as shall be agreeable to equity and to which Plaintiffs
are entitled.

Dated this 8th day of August, 2000.

?6nrad B. Houser
Attorney for Plaintiff
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
This Employment Agreement ("This Agreement") is made effective as of
January 1, 1992, Thrifty Nickel ("The Employer") of 712 South State,
Orem,Utah. Jose S. Salazar and Mildred 0. Salazar ("The Employees")2239
Tempview, Provo, Utah.
A. Employer is engaged in the business of Publishing Classified
Newspapers.
B. Employer desires to have services of Employees.
C. Employees are willing to be employed by Employer.
Therefore, the parties agree as follows:
1. EMPLOYMENT. Employees shall provide to Employer the following services:
Distribution Managers including; logging routes, hiring drivers, distributing
the Thrifty Nickel, getting new locations, upkeep of all indoor and outdoor
racks, dealing with the printer and any other assigned company initiatives as
required.
2. BEST EFFORTS OF EMPLOYEES. Employees agree to perform faithfully,
industriously and to the best of Employee's ability, experience and talents,
all of the duties that may be required by the express and implicit terms of
this Agreement, to the reasonable satisfaction of Employer. Such duties shall
be provided at the Orem, Provo and Salt Lake City, Utah area and at "such other
place(s) as the needs, business, or opportunities of the Employer may require
from time to time.
3. SALARY. Employer will make salary payments bi-weekly to the Employees in
the amount of $700.00 each per week, for a total of $1400.00 per week.
4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OPERATIONS. Employees shall provide Employer
with all information, suggestions and recommendations regarding Employer's
business, of which Employees have knowledge, that will be of benefit to
Employer.
5. CONFIDENTIALITY. Employees recognizes that Employer has and will have
information regarding the following:
-costs
-future plans
-processes
-trade secrets
-copyrights
-assets/financial information
-computer processes, programs and codes
-distribution locations
Employees will not at any time or in any manner, either directly or indirectly
divulge, disclose, or communicate any information to any third party without
the written consent of the Employer. Employees will protect the information
and treat it as strictly confidential.
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6. VACATION. Full time Employees will receive 1 week vacation after 1 year of
employment with salary paid in full. 2 years of employment will receive 8 days
vacation time off with salary paid in full. 3 years of employment will receive
10 days vacation time off with salary paid in full. 4 years of employment will
receive 12 days vacation time off with salary paid in full and 5 or more years
of employment will receive 3 weeks of vacation time off with salary paid in
full.
7. HOLIDAYS. Employees shall be entitled to the following holidays with pay
during each calendar year:
-New Year's Day
-Memorial Day
-Independence Day
-Labor Day
-Thanksgiving Day
-Christmas Eve
-Christmas Day
8. OTHER BENEFITS. After 1 year of employment:
-Paid medical and dental insurance.
-Family leave and Medical leave.
-Military leave.
-Jury leave.
-Recreational Activities (Upon approval of Employer)
-Automobile maintenance and upkeep.
-Automobile gasoline for employment duties.
-Retirement at age 65 for 10 years in the amount of $600 per week.
9. SEVERANCE PAY. Severance pay is only due to employees that have been a
employee for 5 years or more. If after working for the Thrifty Nickel in a
faithful and acceptable manner and later wrongfully terminated without cause,
Employees shall be paid as severance compensation by calculating the salary
made in the previous twelve (12) months and dividing it by 52 weeks to get a
weekly rate of pay for a period of the lesser of the remaining portion of the
initial term or six (6) months from the date of such termination provided.
However, that if Employee is employed by a new employer during such period,
the severance compensation payable to Employee during such period will be
reduced by the amount of compensation that Employee actually receives from the
new employer. Employee may in Employee's sole discretion, by delivery of a
notice to Employer within thirty (30)days following a termination elect to
receive from Compensation a lump sum severance payment by bank cashier's check
equal to the present value of the flow of cash payments that would otherwise
be paid to Employee pursuant to this section. Employee shall continue to enjoy
any benefits under any plans of the Employer in which Employee is a
participant to the full extent of Employee's rights under such plans,
including any perquisites provided under this Agreement, through the remaining
term of this Agreement; provided, however, that the benefits under any such
plans of the Employer in which Employee is a participant, including any such
perquisites, shall cease upon re-employment by a new employer.

ADDENDUM C

10. PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS. Employer's obligation to pay Employees the
compensation and to make the arrangements provided herein shall be
unconditional, and Employee shall have no obligation whatsoever to mitigate
damages hereunder. If litigation after termination without cause shall be
brought to enforce or interpret any provision contained herein, Employer, to
the extent permitted by applicable law, indemnifies Employees for Employee's
reasonable attorneys' fees and disbursements incurred in such litigation.
11. INDEMNIFICATION. In addition to any rights to indemnification to which
Employee is entitled to, Employer shall indemnify Employee at all times during
and after the term of this Agreement or any successor provision thereof and
any other applicable state law, and shall pay Employees expenses in defending
any civil or criminal action, suit, or proceeding, to the maximum extent
permitted under such applicable state laws.
a. AGREEMENT. The act of coming to^-a mutual understanding between two
(2) or more competent;^p-aT5ties>£o do or not to do certain
consideration (s) ./^
/
//
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EMPLOYE

EMPLOYEE

EMPLOYEE

DATE-— —
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Conrad B. Houser (3612)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
136 East South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: 801 539-0044
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR

AFFIDAVIT OF JOSE S. SALAZAR

Plaintiffs
-vs-

Judge Frederick

THRIFTY NICKEL INC., a Utah Corporation,
WANT ADS OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC., a Utah
Corporation, SOUTHERN CROSS, INC. a Utah
Corporation, ROBERT L. CHRISTENSEN, and
NORMAN WILKINSON

District Court Civil No. 000906212

Defendants
STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Jose S. Salazar, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years and I have personal knowledge of the matters
stated herein.

2.

I have been an employee of various Thrifty Nickel companies in New Mexico and Utah
since 1982.
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3.

I was induced to continue my employment with Thrift Nickel companies by moving to
Utah to help develop Thrifty Nickel of Orem. A central part of that inducement was
the security gained by way of an Employment Agreement.

4.

I personally signed the Employment Agreement agreeing to comply with the terms
thereof. Tim Taylor and my wife Mildred also signed the Employment Agreement.

5.

I have worked for several Thrifty Nickel companies over the last nineteen years. The
Employment Agreement was made in the name of Thrifty Nickel rather than any one of
the specific Thrifty Nickel companies to provide future flexibility.

6.

It is my understanding that Robert L. Christensen approved the Employment
Agreement, was fully aware of the need for it and of its terms.

7.

I have, over the past nineteen years, had a close and cordial personal relationship with
Robert L. Christensen, been invited to his home for family and holiday meals, worked
directly with him on projects, and loyally worked to build up his companies.

8.

Norm Wilkerson, a Thrifty Nickel executive, reaffirmed the validity of the Employment
Agreement when he came to my home in August of 1999 and told me the job, salary,
and other working conditions would be the same even though the name of the
company was going to change.

9.

Robert L. Christensen reaffirmed the validity of the Employment Agreement at the
State Street office in August of 1999 when, at yet another switching of Thrifty Nickel
Page 2 of 3
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companies, he said to me, " All will be the same.

i

DATED this AL day of January, 2001.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this J L day of January, 2001.

UX/ M —

<1M
NOTARY PUBLIC

r
:%8^kfffljuJz^
Residing in _i
My Commission Expires
* j * * * ^ ^
Notary Pubfc
•
I / ^ J S ^ \
CAMfLLE J. CANC€S I
1 /* i?P$^&
*\
S565 South 9O0 East
i
i £ \ ; € Z Sal- L^e Crty, Utah 84117 J
, Ti* 0 ^ j ?

October 25 20G1
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ADDENDUM E

Conrad B. Houser (3612)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
136 East South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: 801 539-0044
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR

AFFIDAVIT OF MILDRED O.
SALAZAR

Plaintiffs
-vs-

Judge Frederick

THRIFTY NICKEL INC., a Utah Corporation,
WANT ADS OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC., a Utah
Corporation, SOUTHERN CROSS, INC. a Utah
Corporation, ROBERT L. CHRISTENSEN, and
NORMAN WILKINSON

District Court Civil No. 000906212

Defendants
STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Mildred O. Salazar, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years and I have personal knowledge of the matters
stated herein.

2.

I have been an employee of various Thrifty Nickel companies in New Mexico and Utah
since 1982.
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3.

I was induced to continue my employment with Thrift Nickel companies by moving to
Utah to help develop Thrifty Nickel of Orem. A central part of that inducement was
the security gained by way of an Employment Agreement.

4.

I personally signed the Employment Agreement agreeing to comply with the terms
thereof. Tim Taylor and my husband Jose also signed the Employment Agreement.

5.

I have worked for several Thrifty Nickel companies over the last nineteen years. The
Employment Agreement was made in the name of Thrifty Nickel rather than any one of
the specific Thrifty Nickel companies to provide future flexibility.

6.

It is my understanding that Robert L. Christensen approved the Employment
Agreement, was fully aware of the need for it and of its terms.

7.

I have, over the past nineteen years, had a close and cordial personal relationship with
Robert L. Christensen, been invited to his home for family and holiday meals, worked
directly with him on projects, and loyally worked to build up his companies.

8.

Norm Wilkerson, a Thrifty Nickel executive, reaffirmed the validity of the Employment
Agreement when he came to our home in August of 1999 and told us the job, salary,
and other working conditions would be the same even though the name of the
company was going to change.

9.

Robert L. Christensen reaffirmed the validity of the Employment Agreement at the
State Street office in August of 1999 when, at yet another switching of Thrifty Nickel
Page 2 of 3

companies, he said to me, "All will be the same.

DATED this J L day of January, 2001.

]

(]^^f// rf Ardktf**'

Mildred O. Salazar

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this J L day of January, 2001.

NOTARY PUBXIC
Residing in

fftUm Lfim^Y

My Commission Expires
I
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ADDENDUM

Conrad B. Houser (3612)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
136 East South Temple
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR

AFFIDAVIT OF TIM TAYLOR

Plaintiffs
-vs-

Judge Frederick

THRIFTY NICKEL INC., a Utah Corporation, et.
al.

District Court Civil No. 000906212

Defendants
STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Tim Taylor, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years and I have personal knowledge of the matters
stated herein.

2.

I personally drafted the Employment Agreement between Thrifty Nickel and Jose and
Mildred Salazar dated 1/1/92 and attached hereto.

3.

The subject Employment Agreement was provided by Thrifty Nickel both to induce
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the Salazars to move from New Mexico to Utah and to reward them for their years of
service in New Mexico.

4.

The subject Employment Agreement was suggested by, discussed around the table
with, and approved by my father, Robert L. Christensen and his wife / my Mother
Mary.

5.

I signed the subject Employment Agreement as an agent for my father, Robert L.
Christensen and as President of Thrifty Nickel of Orem.

6.

The Thrifty Nickel empire is made up of a large number of affiliated companies
throughout the United States. Many of these companies are transitory in nature, being
used for various purposes, at various times, in various localities. All or most of these
companies are owned or controlled by my Father, Robert L. Christensen. I have been
an officer in several of these companies.

7.

The subject Employment Agreement was purposely made in the name of Thrifty
Nickel rather than any of the many companies making up the Thrifty Nickel empire to
provide flexibility in case the Salazars where shifted or transferred from one company
to another within the Thrifty Nickel organization.
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8.

Since the subject Employment Agreement was executed, the Salazars have worked for
Thrifty Nickel of Orem, Thrifty Nickel of Salt Lake City, Southern Cross, and possible
other Thrifty Nickel companies.

•

*

\

DATED this ^ "day of January, 2001

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this V^day of January, 2001.

Notary Public-State Of Nevada
COUNTY OF CLARK

ELSA PACIS OGLESBY
No. 0 0 ^ 5 4 4 - 1

My Appointment Expires
March 22, 2004

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in

My Commission Expires:
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Scott A. Call, #0544
James H. Tily, #8809
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Facsimile: (801)364-7697

DEC 2 9 2000

Attorneys for Defendant Robert L. Christensen

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O.
SALAZAR,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
) DEFENDANT CHRISTENSEN'S
) MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

)

THIRFTY NICKLE OF OREM, INC., a
Utah corporation; WANT ADS OF SALT
LAKE CITY, INC., a Utah corporation;
SOUTHERN CROSS, INC., a Utah
corporation; ROBERT L.
CHRISTENSEN, an individual; and
NORMAN WILKINSON, an individual,

) Civil No. 000906212
) Judge Frederick
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

Defendant Robert L. Christensen ("Christensen"), by and through his undersigned
counsel, respectfully moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, for an order dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint against Christensen for failure to state

Conrad B. Houser (3612)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
136 East South Temple
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR

MOTION TO SERVE DEFENDANT
ROBERT L. CHRISTENSEN BY MAIL

Plaintiffs
-vs-

Judge Frederick

THRIFTY NICKEL INC., a Utah Corporation,
WANT ADS OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC., a Utah
Corporation, SOUTHERN CROSS, INC. a Utah
Corporation, ROBERT L. CHRISTENSEN, and
NORMAN WILKINSON

District Court Civil No. 000906212

Defendants

Plaintiffs Jose S. and Mildred O. Salazar ("Salazar") by and through their attorney Conrad B.
Houser, submit this U.R.C.P. 4(g) MOTION TO SERVE DEFENDANT ROBERT L.
CHRISTENSEN BY CERTIFIED MAIL based on the following:
1.

Robert L. Christensen is aware of the subject lawsuit. He has seen or been told in detail
of its claims and damage requests. He has responded through others to the Plaintiffs
that "they will never get a penny out of him."

2.

Robert L. Christensen's lawyer is likely to be the same attorney who represents Souther
Cross, Inc. and Norman Wilkinson, namely Scott A. Call. Plaintiff's lawyer requested
that he accept service on behalf of Mr. Christensen but he was not given authority by
Mr. Christensen to do so.

3.

Over a period of 24 days process service George C. Duke attempted to serve Robert L.
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Christensen. His log is attached as a DECLARATION OF DILIGENCE. Mr. Duke
concluded on several occasions that Mr. Christensen was "evading/7 He left business
cards but Mr. Christensen did not respond.
4.

Good cause exists to believe that Robert L. Christensen is avoiding service of process.
Plaintiffs therefore requests the Clerk of this Court to serve him by mail as provided in
Rule 4(g) of the U.R.CP.

Dated this 6th day of November, 2000.

Conrad B. Houser
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOSE S. SALAZAR, et al,

:

MINUTE ENTRY RULING

Plaintiff(s),

:

CASE NO. 000906212 CN

:

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

:

Date:

vs.
THRIFTY NICKEL, INC., et al,
Defendant(s),

December 6, 2000

:

After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice
to Submit for Decision filed December 4, 2000, the Court rules as
follows:
1. There being no timely opposition, Plaintiffs' Motion for
Alternate Service is granted.
2. The order submitted is executed December 6, 2000.

Conrad B. Houser (3612)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
136 East South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-0044
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm^mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm

JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR

Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories

-vs-

Judge Dennis Frederick

THRIFTY NICKEL INC, a Utah Corporation, et
al.

District Court Civil No. 000906212

Defendants

Plaintiffs, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, submit the following Interrogatories to defendant Robert L. Christensen. These
interrogatories are to be responded to by defendant Robert L. Christensen within 30 days of
the date of service. If objection is made to any Interrogatory herein, or any part thereof
defendants are hereby requested to set forth with particularity specific objection as to each
part

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE

These Interrogatories are to be deemed continuing in nature so as to require
supplemental responses should additional information be received between
the time responses are made and the time of trial.

INTERROGATORY #1, Were you involved in any way in the incorporation of any of
the defendant corporations listed in his lawsuit? Is so, state each and every way in which you
were involved in the incorporation of each.

INTERROGATORY #2. Do you now or did you previously own stock in any
corporation that is listed as a defendant in tins lawsuit? If so, state the number of shares you
own now or have owned at any and all times and the percentage of your ownership as
measured against the total outstanding shares of each respective corporation attendant to each
ownership position.

INTERROGATORY #3. Did you have any input into the making of or knowledge of
the existence of the Employment Agreement with plaintiffs? If so, state your involvement in
creating the Agreement and at what times and under what circumstances you had knowledge
of the Agreements.

INTERROGATORY #4, Have you ever served as a director, officer, or representative of
any of the defendants in this lawsuit? If so, state the name of each such position and the date
on which you assumed any such position and the date on which you left any such position

INTERROGATORY #5- Did you ever loan money to any of the defendant corporations
in this lawsuit? If so, state:
(A) The date and amount of each such loan.
(B) The balance stilled owed on each loan.

INTERROGATORY #6. Did any of the defendant corporations loan you any money? If
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so, state:
(A) The date and amount of each such loan.
(B) The balance still owed on any loan if any.
INTERROGATORY #7. Did you ever guaranty or cosign any obligation of any of the
defendant corporations in this lawsuit? If so, state:
(A) The date and amount of each such cosignature or loan.
(B) The balance still owed on any loan if any.

INTERROGATORY #8. Did any of the defendants listed in this lawsuit ever advance
funds to you for services to be performed later? If so, please state the amount of money
advanced to you by any defendant in this case and the amount of money that was advanced to
you on each occasion it was advanced.

INTERROGATORY #9. At any time since 1996, did you incorporate or cause to he
incorporated any other corporation? If so, state for each incorporation the name of the
corporation, the date of the corporation, and the state of incorporation.

INTERROGATORY #10. For each factual denial set forth in your Answer to the
Plaintiffs Complaint, state in detail all facts upon which you base such denial, the name,
home address home telephone number, business address and business telephone number of
ml witnesses to those facts and the identity of all documents supporting such facts.

Conrad Houser
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
Dated: February 27,2001
Page 3 of 5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICZ
I certify that on February 27,2001,1 mailed a copy of these Interrogatories to:

Attorney Scott A. Call
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Uke City, Utah 84101-2006.

Conrad B. Houser
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Conrad B. Houser (3612)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
136 East South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-0044
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED O. SALAZAR

Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs Request for Production of
Documents

-vs-

Judge Frederick

THRIFTY NICKEL INC., a Utah Corporation, et
al.

District Court Civil No. 000906212

Defendants

Plaintiffs, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, submit herewith the following Request for Production of Documents to all
defendants. These requests are to be responded to by all defendants within 30 days of the
date of service. If objection is made to any requests for Production of Documents, or any part
thereof defendants are hereby requested to set forth with particularity this specific objection as
to each part

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE

These Requests for Production are to be deemed continuing in nature so as to require
supplemental responses should additional documents or information be received between

the time the responses are made and the time of trial.
All documents are to be produced which are in the possession of the individual or
corporate party, his attorney's, investigators, consultants, experts, agents, employees, or other
representatives of the names parties and their attorney.
Photocopies of all documents are requested to be served on the Plaintiff's attorney at
his office located at 136 East South Temple, Suite 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

1. A copy of the Articles of Incorporation of THRIFTY NICKEL INC, a Utah
corporation, et al
2. A copy of the Articles of Incorporation of WANT ADS OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC,
a Utah Corporation.
3. A copy of the Articles of Incorporation of SOUTHERN CROSS, INC a Utah
Corporation.
4. A copy of the Articles of Incorporation of THRIFTY NICKEL OF OREM, INC
5. A copy of the By-Laws of each corporation listed in paragraph 1 through 4 above.
6. A copy of the Certificate of Incorporation from the Secretary of the State of Utah of
each corporation listed in paragraphs 1 through 4 above.
7.

A copy of the Notice of Incorporation of each corporation listed in paragraphs 1

through 4 above.
8.

Copies of the minutes of all meetings of the Board of Directors of each corporation

listed in paragraphs 1 through 4 above.
9.

Copies of all minutes of shareholders of each corporation listed in paragraphs 1

through 4 above.
10. Copies of all documents evidencing loans from Robert L. Christensen to each
Page 2 of 5
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corporation listed in paragraphs 1 through 4 above.
11 Copies of all documents evidencing loans from any family member, relative or
friend of Robert L. Christensen or any business affiliated with Robert L. Christensen to each
corporation listed in paragraphs 1 through 4 above.
12. Copies of all documents evidencing loans by each corporation listed in paragraphs
1 through 4 above to any family member, relatives or friend of Robert L. Christensen or to any
business affiliated with Robert L. Christensen.
13. Copies of corporate records or ledgers evidencing the identity and address of each
person or entity who has owned stock in each corporation listed in paragraphs 1 through 4
above during the past five years, the consideration paid or promised for he stock and the
dates on which the consideration was paid or promised.
14. Copies of corporate records or ledgers evidencing the issuance of actual stock
certificates at any time since the incorporation of each corporation listed in paragraphs 1
through 4 above to whom they were issued and the dates of issue,
15. For each bank account maintained in the name of each corporation listed in
paragraphs 1 through 4 above, a copy of the monthly statement for the period beginning
January 1,1996 through March 1,2001
16. Copies of the federal tax returns of each corporation listed in paragraphs 1 through
4 above, including all schedules and attachments, for each of the past five years beginning
with 19%.
17. Copies of any reports prepared by experts or consultants whom any defendant
intends to call at trial or rely on at trial.
18. Copies of any reports prepared by investigators or consultants of any of the
defendants.
19. Copies of any exhibits the defendants intends to offer at trial
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Conrad Houser
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
Dated: February 27,2001
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on February 27,2001,1 mailed a copy of this Request for Production of
Documents by first class mail to:

Attorney Scott A. Call
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake Ciiy, Utah 84101-2006.

,

r\

Conrad B. Houser
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1

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

-oOo-

4

JOSE S. SALAZAR and MILDRED
O. SALAZAR,

5
6
7
8
9
10

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 000906212
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

(Videotape Proceedings^

THRIFTY NICKEL OF OREM,
INC., WAND ADS OF SALT
LAKE CITY, UTAH, SOUTHERN
CROSS, INC., ROBERT L.
CHRISTENSEN and NORMAN
WILKINSON,
Defendants.

11

-oOo-

12

March,

13

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 5th day of/2001,

14

commencing at the hour of 9:08 a.m., the above-entitled

15

matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE J. DENNIS

16

FREDERICK, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for

17

the purpose of this cause, and that the following

18

videotape proceedings were had.

19

A P P E A R A N C E S
CONRAD B. HOUSER
For the Plaintiffs:
Attorney at Law
136 East South Temple
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah

20
21
22
23

For the Defendants:

24
25

SCOTT A. CALL
Attorney at Law
Anderson & Karrenberg
50 West 300 South, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101

ALAN P. SMITH, CSR

IMPY

84111

385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107

to what Mr* Christensen's real involvement is. They are
adequately pled and we feel like this case is properly before
the Court and should proceed through the rest of the
discovery process.
Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Houser.

On a motion to dismiss, the issue of the equitable
nature of the claims asserted by the respective parties is
really beyond the scheme of my inquiry here, Mr. Houser.
From my perception of the way that the complaint is
alleged—alleges causes of action, it seems to me that
there's no question that Mr. Christensen's motion to dismiss
is well taken.

There are insufficient allegations, in my

estimation, to give proper and fair notice of the claim of
alter ego or an intent by the plaintiffs to pierce a
corporate veil.
All that's alleged is that Mr. Christensen was an
owner, that he had knowledge of the contract and has—as both
counsel have pointed out, the sum total of the allegations
incident to Christensen's involvement here do not give fair
notice of a claim of attempt to breach corporate veil; ergo,
the motion to dismiss is granted for the reasons specified in
the supporting memoranda.
You prepare the appropriate order, Mr. Call.
MR. CALL:

Thank you, your Honor.
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